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Semantics of Traumatic Causation
Richard M. Markus*
S OMETIME BEFORE THE TRIAL of every personal injury case, each
lawyer involved must make sure that the physicians whom
he will call to testify understand the legal meaning of certain
medical words. Counsel have not sufficiently prepared their case
from a medical viewpoint, when they have ascertained the trauma
sustained and its medical consequences. The lawyer must also
educate the doctor about legal technicalities which will control
the significance of the doctor's testimony. Among the most im-
portant formal requirements on the physician's testimony are
those which relate to the language of causation. This article will
discuss the views of various jurisdictions, the conflict between
those views and accepted principles of semantics and medicine,
and possible solutions to eliminate apparent incongruities in this
area of the law.
Can counsel ask whether the incident involved was "the
direct cause" of the condition which was later found by the
physician? Can the physician testify that there is a "possible"
causal relationship between the incident and the plaintiff's pres-
ent condition? When is it proper to use such words as "could,"
"might," "likely," "probably," "may have," or other words or
phrases which describe the certainty and uncertainty of causal
relationship? An examination of the decisions from the courts
of different jurisdictions shows that there is no single or uni-
versal answer to those questions. Acceptable language in one
jurisdiction is an anathema in the next jurisdiction. Necessary
phrases for one court are strictly prohibited in the next. These
conflicts result in large part from the difference in rationale ap-
plied by the various tribunals. For the most part, three basic
analytical categories encompass the reasoning of the various
courts and the consequent language approved by them: (1) Does
the testimony invade the jury's province on questions of ul-
timate fact? (2) Does the testimony express sufficient certainty
to have probative value? (3) Does the testimony aid the jury in
its deliberations?
* B.S., Northwestern Univ.; LL.B., Harvard; member of the Ohio and D.C.
Bars; member of Sindell, Sindell, Bourne, Markus & McElroy, Cleveland,
Ohio; Instructor at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
234 12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2) May, 1963
The first viewpoint emphasizes the effect of a physician's ex-
pert testimony as tending to decide the ultimate question pre-
sented to the jury. For example, a long line of Illinois decisions
held that the expert should never be allowed to testify that the
circumstances involved "did cause" the plaintiff's difficulties, or
that such circumstances are "the cause" of the present con-
dition.' Similar rulings have come from Iowa,2 Michigan,3 Mis-
souri,4 and New York.5 Some of these states have periodically
recanted and adopted different positions under the theories de-
scribed later.6 One Tennessee decision even held that testimony
was improper where the expert witness stated that the incident
involved "probably did" cause the disputed consequences.7 Those
who follow this viewpoint assert that the jury should not be
coerced by a learned expert to a specific conclusion on the ulti-
mate issue. In the language of a leading Illinois decision, the
basis for this doctrine is as follows: s
Whether or not the collision or accident caused traumatic
neurasthenia in the defendant in error [the plaintiff], or
caused the tumor in her breast, are ultimate facts upon
which the jury must make their findings. It is no more proper
for physicians to settle those questions for the jury by their
direct answers than it would be for a motorman of another
street car company to settle the question of negligence by
testifying in broad terms that the plaintiff in error [the de-
fendant] was guilty of negligence....
1 Illinois C. R. R. v. Smith, 208 Ill. 608, 70 N. E. 628 (1904); Fellows-Kim-
brough v. Chicago City RR, 272 Il. 71, 111 N. E. 499 (1916); People v.
Gleitsmann, 361 Ill. 165, 197 N. E. 557 (1935).
2 Crouch v. National L. S. RR, 241 Iowa 425, 217 N. W. 557 (1928); Lukin
v. Marbel, 219 Iowa 773, 259 N. W. 782 (1935); Strever v. Woodward, 160
Iowa 332, 141 N. W. 931 (1913); Sever v. Minneapolis & St. L. RR, 156
Iowa 664, 137 N. W. 937 (1912) (opinion as to the "probable" cause of an
injury also held improper for the same reason).
3 DeGroot v. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 247 N. W. 69 (1933); Layton v. Cregan
and M. Co., 265 Mich. 574, 252 N. W. 337 (1933).
4 Taylor v. Grand Ave. RR, 185 Mo. 239, 84 S. W. 873 (1905); Glasgow v.
Metropolitan St. RR, 191 Mo. 347, 89 S. W. 915 (1905); Smart v. Kansas
City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S. W. 709 (1907); Maloney v. United Railways Co.,
237 S. W. 509 (Mo. 1922).
5 Marx v. Ontario B. H. & A. Co., 211 N. Y. 33, 105 N. E. 97 (1914).
6 E.g., Sanitary Dist. v. Ind'l. Comm'n., 343 Ill. 236, 175 N. E. 372 (1931);
O'Leary v. Scullin Steel Co., 303 Mo. 363, 260 S. W. 55 (1924); McMartin
v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 239 App. Div. 296, 267 N. Y. S. 473 (1933).
7 Cumberland T. & T. Co. v. Peacher Mill Co., 129 Tenn. 374, 164 S. W. 745
(1914) (witness was expert on electricity testifying on cause of fire). This
decision was apparently overruled in National L. & A. Ins. Co. v. Follett,
168 Tenn. 647, 80 S. W. 2d 92 (1935).
8 Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago RR, 272 Ill. 71, 111 N. E. 499 (1916).
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SEMANTICS OF CAUSATION
Similar statements can be found in most decisions which outlaw
testimony which seemingly expresses certainty as to the causal
connection between the accident and the injuries.
It follows that courts which apply this rule necessarily ap-
prove language which purportedly expresses much less certainty.
Since almost all jurisdictions agree that a physician has expert
knowledge which can assist a jury in its deliberations, the courts
denying definitive positive testimony about the causal relation-
ship will ordinarily approve testimony that the condition "might"
have resulted from the accident. 9 In those jurisdictions counsel
and the physician are freely encouraged to discuss possibilities.
These courts reason that a physician may testify that there is a
possible connection between the claimed consequences and the
incident, and that the jury may combine that scientific possibility
with the non-scientific circumstances developed in evidence to
conclude that there was in fact a direct and proximate causal
relationship. Thus, an early Iowa case stated: 10
In a case of this kind, it may become highly important
that an expert shall enlighten the jury upon subjects of a
technical or scientific character. The expert may be per-
mitted, under certain circumstances, to express an opinion
as to whether, in his judgment, a certain condition arising
in a scientific or technical field, may have been brought
about from certain causes, but never may the expert be per-
mitted to invade the province of the jury and express any
opinion as to the ultimate facts to be determined by the
jury.
In summary, therefore, courts following this viewpoint prohibit
too great an assertion of certainty in testimony about causal con-
nection, while embracing somewhat more ethereal expert opin-
ions about "maybes" and "mights."
At the opposite end of the spectrum are the courts which
seem less concerned about an invasion of the jury's province,"
9 See cases cited above at notes 1-5.
10 Sachra v. Town of Manila, 120 Iowa 562, 95 N. W. 198 (1903).
11 See, for example, the court's syllabus in Shepherd v. Midland Mut. L.
Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N. E. 2d 156 (1949): "Where an ultimate fact
to be determined by the jury is one depending upon the interpretation of
certain scientific facts which are beyond the experience, knowledge, or
comprehension of the jury, a witness qualified to speak as to the subject
matter involved may express an opinion as to the probability or actuality
of a fact pertinent to an issue in the case, and the admission of such opin-
ion in evidence does not constitute an invasion or usurpation of the prov-
ince or function of the jury, even though such opinion is on the ultimate
facts which the jury must determine."
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but are determined to require expressions with a high degree of
certainty before the testimony has probative value. Here, a
physician's conclusion that the plaintiff's condition "might" have
resulted from the accident would be stricken.12 A doctor in this
court would not be permitted to testify that it was "possible" for
the trauma to cause these results. 13 These jurisdictions insist that
the degree of certainty be expressed as "probable" or in some
instances even more strongly. A South Carolina court 4 insisted
that the only acceptable form of testimony which expressed suf-
ficient certainty is a conclusion that the accident "most probably"
caused the plaintiff's difficulties. Evidently courts following this
line of thought construe the words "possible," "might," or "may
have been," to mean an unlikely relationship that is remotely con-
ceivable. Whether the word "could" expresses sufficient cer-
tainty is a disputed matter among courts applying this rationale. 15
Since the jurors in these jurisdictions must find that the al-
leged consequences resulted from the incident in suit, by the
greater weight of the evidence, the witness must affirmatively
establish that his conclusion is likewise founded upon the greater
1Z Bearman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 186 F. 2d 662 (10th Cir., 1951); Lyons
v. Chicago City RR, 258 Ill. 75, 101 N. E. 211 (1913); Saaf v. Duluth P. P. R.
Ass'n., 240 Minn. 60, 59 S. W. 2d 883 (1953); McLaughlin v. Curtis-Quillen
Co., 223 App. Div. 208, 227 N. Y. S. 712 (1928); Windham v. City of Flor-
ence, 221 S. C. 350, 70 S. E. 2d 553 (1952).
13 Baeza v. Remington Arms Co., 122 Colo. 510, 224 P. 2d 223 (1950); Packer
v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 158 Kans. 580, 149 P. 2d 629 (1944); Aiken v.
Ind'l Comm'n, 143 Ohio St. 113, 53 N. E. 2d 1018 (1944); Stacey v. Car-
negie-Illinois Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 205, 101 N. E. 2d 897 (1951); Stampas
v. Dept. of Labor, 38 Wash. 2d 48, 227 P. 2d 739 (1951); Meyer v. Froni-
mades, 2 Wis. 2d 89, 86 N. W. 2d 25 (1957).
14 Windham v. City of Florence, 221 S. C. 350, 70 S. E. 2d 553 (1952); see
also Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S. C. 440, 114 S. E. 2d 828 (1960).
15 The following decisions apparently find that "could" means "probable":
Yellow Cab Co. v. McCullers, 98 Ga. App. 601, 106 S. E. 2d 535 (1958);
Cunningham v. Maxwell, 6 App. Div. 2d 366, 176 N. Y. S. 2d 720 (1958).
Oklahoma Nat. Cas. Co. v. Kelly, 194 Okla. 646, 153 P. 2d 1010 (1944). On
the other hand, these cases apparently construe the word "could" to mean
"possible" rather than "probable": Brandt v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc.,
153 Ohio St. 429, 92 N. E. 2d 1 (1950); Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 46 A,
2d 469 (1946). Numerous others phrases have been accepted or rejected
as the particular court thought it appropriate at that time. E.g., Boze v.
Ind'l Comm'n, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 238 (1940) ("quite possible" and "most
logical" are equivalent to "probable"); Boland v. Vanderbilt, 140 Conn. 520,
102 A. 2d 362 (1953) ("likely connection" means "probable cause"); Shatto
v. Grabin, 233 Iowa 46, 6 N. W. 2d 149 (1942) ("reasonable cause" held
admissible); Vaccaro v. Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 12 (E. D. Pa. 1955)
("definite possibility" held insufficient); Benjamin v. Holyoke St. RR, 160




weight of his mental faculties. From a mathematical viewpoint,
these courts would seem to be concerned with facts whose prob-
ability exceeded 50%, and totally disinterested in facts whose
probability was 50% or less. A review of the decisions in this
area of the law suggests that this judicial viewpoint has gained
increasing momentum and acceptance.
The third judicial rule for semantics acknowledges the uncer-
tainty of language. This view accepts testimony by an expert
physician as to the likelihood of causal connection in almost any
terms which the witness deems appropriate. Here the courts note
that testimony which ascribes any degree of probability, whether
greater or less than 50%, assists the jury in its deliberations. Re-
cent Missouri decisions,' 6 some cases from Maryland, 17 In-
diana,1s Iowa, 19 and scattered rulings from other states, seem to
support this type of analysis.20 Because of his special training
and experience the physician has knowledge which can materially
aid a jury in its evaluation of the testimony. If the physician
chooses to employ phrases or words which fall below a judicially
created semantic standard, he may nevertheless assist the jury in
reaching a proper decision.
Some of these rulings suggest that the choice of language
by the physician is not necessarily expressive of his true thoughts,
and that the language can best be interpreted and understood by
the jury which receives it from the witness in all of the sur-
rounding environment of the testimony. A few would receive
opinion testimony, even where the witness unequivocally ac-
knowledges that his conclusion is rendered with less than 50%
probability, because it nevertheless aids the trier of facts when
combined with other fact and expert testimony. Courts follow-
ing this line of approach do not abandon the requirement that
16 Walker v. St. L. Pub. Serv. Co., 362 Mo. 648, 243 S. W. 2d 92 (1951);
Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S. W. 2d 314 (Mo. App. 1948); Kenney
v. J. A. Folger and Co., 192 S. W. 2d 73 (Mo. App. 1946); Butsey Hahn v.
McDowell, 349 S. W. 2d 479 (Mo. App. 1961).
17 Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 51 A. 2d 642 (1947);
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 50 A. 2d
256 (1946); Butsey Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 167 A. 2d
96 (1961).
18 Magazine v. Shull, 116 Ind. App. 79, 60 N. E. 2d 611 (1945).
19 Cody v. Toller Drug Co., 232 Iowa 475, 5 N. W. 2d 824 (1942).
20 This is not the same situation as is presented where the words "prob-
able" and "possible" are construed to mean the same thing. Lucey Boiler
& Mfg. Corp. v. Sich, 188 Tenn. 700, 22 S. W. 2d 19 (1949).
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the plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence to sustain his burden of proof. Instead, they simply find
that the expert opinion testimony, in whatever terms it is ex-
pressed, should be considered with all the other testimony in
deciding whether sufficient evidence of proximate causation was
presented to allow a jury verdict on that question. There are,
then, three viewpoints which in substance hold (a) too great a
degree of certainty is objectionable, (b) too slight a degree of
certainty is objectionable, and (c) any degree of certainty has
some value.
This conflict in principles is further complicated in the fed-
eral courts by the application of Rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which reads in part as follows:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence
heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the
hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence
applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in
which the United States Court is held. In any case, the
statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence
governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the
most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or
rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of
a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner.
This rule has been popularly summarized as saying that evidence
is admissible if proper either in the federal courts generally or
in the state courts where that district court is sitting. Since the
rule applicable in any state court may change from time to time
among the various views described above, and since there is no
well-established pattern of rules in the federal courts, the federal
courts are sometimes left to their own discretion in deciding
whether or not expert medical testimony states the appropriate
degree of certainty in conclusions as to causation. The district
judge is ordinarily a man who previously practiced in the state
where he now holds court, so he usually tends to follow the rules
of that state.
At the same time, the search for a favorable forum might
well induce plaintiff's counsel to select a particular state, or the
federal courts in such state. Traditional principles of conflict of
laws make the evidentiary rules of the forum state the rules
which apply in the trial, since evidence is ordinarily considered




therefore, for a plaintiff's lawyer who anticipates difficulty in
proving a causal relationship between the accident and the in-
juries to select carefully among available jurisdictions, and to
include both state and federal courts in his search for one whose
evidentiary rules permit testimony supporting his theory.
With the above analysis of contrasting views in mind, we
suggest that basic concepts of semantics might well aid a court in
choosing a reasonable semantics rule. In general, semantics could
be described as the study of the meaning of meaning. Most
students of semantics begin by saying that language is a very
limited means of communicating thought.21 Certainly, the words
used by the witness may express something less than his entire
mental processes on the subject involved. In some instances, the
words even create an impression directly contrary to the inten-
tion of the person who is seeking to express himself. When a
witness testifies that there is a "possible" causal relationship
between the automobile collision and the plaintiff's condition of
multiple sclerosis he ascribes no specific mathematical ratio be-
tween the probability of likelihood and unlikelihood.
Despite its limitations, language is the only means available
as a practical matter for the witness to communicate his thoughts
to the trier of facts. Fortunately, the testimony of live witnesses
is more informative because the juror sees the expression on
the witness' face, hears the emphasis given to the words, and
senses something more than the bare language from surround-
ing circumstances of the courtroom. 22 This is, of course, one of
the main reasons why the trier of facts is given broad discretion
in determining the truth, since he has received the testimony in
its full context with all of its overtones and nuances. A review of
the cold transcript seldom reveals the connotations intended or
understood for the testimony.
21 See Lee, Language Habits in Human Affairs, ch. 2, 7 (1941); Chase,
Tyranny of Words, ch. 1 (1938); Ogden, Meaning of Meaning, ch. 1 (1938);
Korzybski, Science and Sanity, ch. 4, 5 (1950).
22 Other factors which can give greater meaning to the words of the wit-
ness are the tone and expression of the questioner, expressions on the face
of the judge, and movements or activities of any person in the courtroom.
The importance of direct observation of the witness is emphasized in Con-
tinental Casualty Co. v. Stokes, 249 F. 2d 152 (5th Cir., 1957). In that case
the medical evidence was presented by document and deposition and
defendant argued that the appellate court had special reason to review the
factual determinations as to the nature and extent of injuries. The appel-
late court pointed out that the plaintiff had testified personally and that
the credibility of his testimony was important to the evaluation of the
medical testimony.
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One semantic approach to this problem points to a process
known as "abstraction." 23 When a witness observes certain oc-
currences, his senses abstract characteristics of that occurrence.
From those multitudinous characteristics, his mental processes
abstract something less than all of the observed factors in formu-
lating an impression. When the witness expresses himself about
the observed phenomenon, he further abstracts by selecting only
a portion of his impressions about which he makes any attempt
to communicate. The listener abstracts further, and his faculties
absorb even fewer of the original characteristics. At some or all
of these stages, additional characteristics may be consciously or
unconsciously added which tend to make the subsequent stages
even further from the original facts. The law recognizes this
process as one of the justifications for exclusion of hearsay testi-
mony, since the reported facts are less reliable as they pass to
persons beyond the original observer.
Thus, oral description of simple observations is subject to in-
completeness and inaccuracy. "I see a red apple" communicates
only a small portion of the real facts and describes those facts in
a greatly oversimplified (consequently inaccurate) fashion. Man-
ifestly, expression of mental comparisons between objects is still
less accurate. And inferential comparisons of intangibles, such as
those required to discuss "cause and effect" relationships, are
among the most nebulous mental evaluations. The verbalization
of those evaluations is at best a poor expression of statistical
averages when compared with the facts originally observed and
the mental processes applied to those facts. This means that a
physician is truly hard pressed to reach a conclusion about
causality with any degree of accuracy as to its mathematical
probability. His verbal statement of that mental analysis is still
fuzzier.
Despite the uncertainty in the physician's mind, and the
even greater uncertainty in his oral expression of that state of
mind, the courts apply standards of rigor which assume that the
doctor has made a specific quantitative determination and has
expressed it in precise fashion to reflect that thought. In other
words, the courts ignore the fact that the word "possible" may
in fact express greater certainty than the word "probable" in
23 See, Korzybski, Science and Sanity, ch. 24-26 (1950); Johnson, People in




some circumstances. 24 Likewise, the courts demand that the
physician limit his testimony to causality involving more than
50% likelihood, when the physician is himself unable to separate
likelihoods of 45% from likelihoods of 55%. This represents
another semantic fallacy, sometimes called "two valued orienta-
tion." 25
The courts infer that a causal relationship is "probable" or
"not probable." However, the infinite gradations between cer-
tainty that a causal relationship is present (100%) and certainty
that it is absent (0%) make such a two valued orientation mean-
ingless or even harmful. When courts refuse to admit testimony
on the ground that it purportedly asserts less than 50% prob-
ability, they ascribe precision to the testimony which is greater
than the witness can honestly supply. Indeed, in many situations
a medical opinion might well be more honestly framed if the
witness testified that there was more than one chance out of four
of a causal relationship (25%) but less than three chances out
of four (75%). The two valued orientation adopted by some
courts requires the rejection of testimony on the theory that less
than 50% certainty has no meaning at all. A fair analysis shows
that an evaluation of likelihood near 50% but below that figure
is truly important since the degree of error in any approximation
is itself substantial.
A study of semantics from an historical viewpoint indicates
the manner in which many societies ascribe fixed meaning to
words, whether or not that meaning is intended by the speaker
or understood by the listener. In some societies, certain words
take on a magical quality so that their mere utterance presum-
ably causes favorable or unfavorable reactions or consequences.20
More enlightened societies should recognize that the words are
merely attempts to express thought which in turn is an attempt
to express observations and inferences. Some judicial decisions
on traumatic causation suggest that courts are willing to ascribe
quasi-magical qualities to particular words of certainty.
Thus, some courts hold the statement by a physician that the
24 The word "possible" was held to express sufficient certainty when cou-
pled with an additional statement that it was "80% possible." Cole v. Simp-
son, 299 Mich. 589, 1 N. W. 2d 2 (1941).
25 See Lee, Language Habits in Human Affairs, 100-111 (1941). For a
detailed discussion of two valued orientation as applied to cause and effect,
see Korzybski, Science and Sanity, ch. 15 (1950).
26 See Chase, Tyranny of Words, ch. 5 (1938); Ogden, Meaning of Mean-
ing, ch. 2 (1938); Lee, Language Habits in Human Affairs, ch. 8 (1941).
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injury was "probably" caused by the accident serves to open
the door to jury consideration, no matter what he or anyone
else might say. It is as if he spoke the words "open sesame" and
the path to jury consideration was established. In those circum-
stances, the words have more effect than their meaning. On the
other hand, some courts would say that testimony of a "possible"
causal connection does not actuate the mechanism which per-
mits jury deliberation, regardless of the additional testimony by
that physician or other non-medical witnesses. This use of
"magic words" results from legal inertia. It is far simpler for a
reviewing court to look for the magical word or phrase, in de-
ciding whether a case was presented for the jury, than to make
a careful analysis of all the testimony, including the medical testi-
mony.
If we consider this language problem from the physician's
position, rather than that of the judge and lawyer, we see even
greater complications. The doctor wishes to express himself ac-
curately and fairly in accordance with his oath to tell the whole
truth. Yet, when he is called to testify, he must adopt awkward
or unnatural language to respond in a manner that has evi-
dentiary value. Since the testifying physician has a natural
identity or affinity for his patient or the person who requested his
professional services, he may be consciously or unconsciously in-
duced to use the requested language, even though it does not
truly reflect his thought pattern. His training has prepared him
to use language of causation for treatment purposes, not for
testimony purposes, so his frame of reference is artificially al-
tered.27
In deciding whether to undertake a course of treatment, the
physician must balance the risk and complexity of the treatment
against the likelihood of its value in aiding the patient. The cause
of the patient's ailment is important as a guide to appropriate
treatment. Virtually every medical treatise emphasizes the value
of a complete history to assist the physician in making a proper
diagnosis and an appropriate plan of treatment. A treating
27 In the preface to their book, The Relation Between Injury and Disease
(1938), Drs. Reed and Emerson make this statement: "Physicians respon-
sible for the care of injured persons in whose condition there is the element
of liability are impressed by the unfairness of many of the settlements
made, if the latter be judged on their scientific merits, although in view
of the medical testimony presented often they may be quite just. For this
reason many injured persons receive little or nothing for physical disabil-
ities and impairments justly compensable, while others receive awards for




physician's decision that there is 30% to 40% likelihood of in-
ternal injuries resulting from trauma might well be sufficient for
him to undertake extensive tests.28 In some circumstances he
might even feel obliged to undertake exploratory surgery even
though the contemplated consequence of the trauma is only a
"possibility" in the legal sense.
Is there any reasonable support for a legal rule that excludes
a physician's testimony as to consequences from a trauma when
his degree of certainty is sufficient to require dangerous opera-
tive procedures? In view of the uncertainty necessarily pre-
sented by limited knowledge available in medical sciences, the
doctor must act upon "maybes" or "mights" in his daily practice.
Why should he be prohibited from expressing those views in
court?
Because the reason for decisions about causality differs in
the medical context from that in the legal context, the words take
on a meaning different to the physician from that for the lawyer.
Many times a physician will state that there is a "possibility" of
a certain medical condition or relationship, and intend to convey
the meaning that there is reason to make further examination or
treatment. Therefore, "possible" can mean an important and
significant likelihood to many practicing physicians. Except for
his rare participation in medical-legal matters, the average phy-
sician may have no occasion to use the word "probable" in de-
scribing the physical condition or the causal source of that con-
dition. Therefore, the word "probable" may assume a meaning
to the physician of near certainty rather than 51% likelihood.
Any lawyer who practices personal injury law receives in-
numerable medical reports in which the physician states that the
condition "could well arise from the accident," or "certainly
28 "In the course of the practice of medicine, every physician and consult-
ant encounters problem patients who, after careful history and examination,
appear to be suffering from persistent symptoms of both a general nature
and from those referable to several specific systems of the body. The
routine laboratory and x-ray diagnostic procedures may be either 'nega-
tive,' 'borderline,' or 'inconclusive.' He is then faced with the problem of:
(1) biding his time, hoping that subsequent events in the clinical course
may clarify the nature of the patient's condition; (2) diagnosing the symp-
tom complex as psychosomatic, if significant elements of anxiety or depres-
sion are present; or (3) intensively pursuing other diagnostic approaches
in the hope that a specific treatment or prognosis may be more readily
ascertained. It has repeatedly impressed the author that these difficult
diagnostic problems are definitely on the increase in this transitional age
of medicine, characterized as it is by both the continuing effective control
of acute illness and the undeniable emphasis upon disease affecting the
middle and older age groups." Roberts, Difficult Diagnosis, 1-2 (1958).
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might" come from the accident. The lawyer realizes that this
doctor needs education as to the legal meaning of the words he
is using. It is sometimes necessary to write for a supplementary
report, with legal explanations by the lawyer, in order to ob-
tain acceptable language which does in fact reflect the true feel-
ings of the physician.
A sad state of affairs has arisen when the lawyer must edu-
cate his professional brother practicing medicine as to the mean-
ing of simple English words. This procedure is demeaning to the
physician, the lawyer, and both professions. Often, the lawyer
must state that this is legal jargon and that the physician must
accept the fact that lawyers use peculiar phrases in a peculiar
manner. This is hardly a means of maintaining respect for the
judicial processes. It is certainly not conducive to the main-
tenance of good relations between the two professions.
The problem is further accented when the physician chooses
to relocate in another jurisdiction. Having been carefully edu-
cated in the few medical-legal matters in which he was called
upon to participate, the doctor now learns that his education is
entirely wrong. All that he has been told is now inapplicable or
false, because the courts in this jurisdiction attach a completely
different meaning to the same words that were defined for him
by the lawyer in the first jurisdiction. If the attorney fails to
educate or re-educate the physician, he runs the real risk that
the doctor's true thoughts will be excluded from evidence, even
though the witness genuinely believes that there is a real causal
connection between the trauma and the alleged sequella.
Solutions to the confusion presented in this area must at-
tempt to accomplish two goals. First, conflict between legal rules
and principles of medicine and semantics should be reduced. Sec-
ond, efforts should be made to eliminate differences which flow
from the fortuity of the forum. Consideration of the matters
discussed earlier suggests strongly that the third rule of judicial
semantics makes the best sense-testimony by the physician
should be admitted in any language or choice of words. Let the
physician express his true thoughts as ably as he can. Fur-
ther elaboration upon his meaning can be obtained by additional
direct examination or cross-examination. Such examination or-
dinarily follows expressions of opinion on causation even in courts
which use the "magic words" approach. However, in such courts,




of the evil words and thereby subject his entire testimony to a
motion to strike.
Judges should refrain from saying that testimony of "prob-
abilities" is proper, while all other testimony is without value.
Recognizing the wide range of likelihoods (0%-100%) and the
physician's inability to speak with precision on this subject, the
courts can adopt practices which conform to sound semantics
and medical management. All of the physician's testimony should
be treated as guidance by a trained expert for the assistance of
the jury. The use or absence of particular key words should be
no basis, standing alone, to authorize submission of the case to
the jury or to refuse its consideration by the jury.
None of this analysis is intended to suggest that the stand-
ard or the burden of proof should be changed in any way. In-
stead, the requirements of proof should be found to have been
satisfied or unsatisfied by a careful analysis of all of the evidence,
including all of the medical testimony, without reference to a
need for particular words. Courts which permit a broad range
of medical language in describing causation ordinarily apply the
same requirements that the plaintiff must establish his case by
a preponderance of the evidence. In arriving at decisions whether
or not sufficient evidence has been presented to merit a jury ver-
dict on this issue, those courts recognize that non-medical cir-
cumstances are oftentimes as important or more important than
the testimony of a physician. 29 While a mere time sequence of
trauma and complaints does not establish their relationship, it
is some evidence for consideration. Few people would deny a
causal relationship between the amputation of a leg and a trauma
shortly before which destroyed most of the tissue of that leg.
Insistence that a doctor come to court and speak the obvious
places formalities above justice. So long as medical knowledge
is clouded with uncertainties, the judge and the juror should be
allowed to apply their own good sense to the facts, after learning
the information and guidance that can be supplied by trained
physicians.
Accomplishment of uniformity among the jurisdictions is a
29 In Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 51 A. 2d 642
(1947), the court said: "The law requires proof of probable, not merely
possible, facts, including causal relations. Reasoning post hoc, propter hoc
is a recognized logical fallacy, a non sequitur. But sequence of events,
plus proof of possible causal relation, may amount to proof of probable
causal relation in the absence of evidence of any other equally probable
cause."
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more difficult project. With at least 51 jurisdictions in the United
States making separate and independent rulings, there are prac-
tical obstacles to the creation of a general national rule. How-
ever, there is one force which has traditionally aided in molding
a uniform procedural jurisprudence. That force is the federal
courts. The adoption of the Federal Rules and their use over
the years has led to the development of counterparts in 17 states
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. There are movements
in many other states to follow the lead of the federal courts in
procedural matters. Traditionally the federal judiciary has been
a strong force for liberality in procedure which removes the
game-like character of litigation. Whether the adoption of a
more practical approach to semantics in medical causation is a
matter for statute, rules, or judicial decision, is beyond the scope
of this article. But it appears that leadership can most effectively
come from that source.
A fitting conclusion to this discussion is the statement of
Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll's memorable Through the
Looking Glass: 30
"There's glory for you." "I don't know what you mean by
'glory,'" Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuous-
ly. "Of course you don't-till I tell you. I meant there's a
nice knock-down argument for you." "But glory doesn't
mean a nice knock-down argument," Alice objected. "When
I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, "it means just what I chose it to mean-neither more
nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can
make words mean so many different things." "The question
is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's
all."
The lawyers and the courts must decide who is to be master-
the word or the witness.
30 Carroll, Through The Looking Glass, ch. 6, pp. 93, 94 (Random House
1946).
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